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Milton’s Plant Eyes:  
Minimal Cognition, Similitude, and Sexuality in the Garden 
 
 
Abstract: This essay turns to minimal cognition, a theoretical extension of embodied cognition, 
to argue for plant sentience in John Milton’s Paradise Lost. Milton imagines plants as minimally 
cognitive beings within an affective ecosystem, where they readily enter into the epic poem’s 
complex circuits of desire with appetites of their own. Specifically, the essay claims that 
botanical cognition arises at the convergence of two seventeenth-century philosophical systems: 
the first, Milton’s materialist monism, and the second, Paracelsian medicine, which purports a 
plant’s therapeutic effect on a human body part sharing morphological resemblance. The essay 
concludes that Milton’s eroticization of similitude enables a new sensus communis where 
cognition is subtler and where nonhuman desire engenders alternate forms of ecologic 
communality. 
 
Keywords: early modern literature, cognitive science, embodied cognition, plant studies, eco-
criticism, queer theory 
 
 Whereas Charles Darwin devoted his early career primarily to geological study and to the 
collection of data that would eventually serve as the basis for On the Origin of Species, his later 
work turned to the subject of plants. With his son Francis, the elder Darwin published one of his 
final studies, The Power of Movement in Plants, which makes the controversial claim that plants 
behave as do the lower animals. Specifically, the Darwins argue for what science now calls the 
root-brain hypothesis, the postulation that a brain-like organ located in the anterior pole of the 
plant body controls growth and tropism. This underground brain, or phytocerebrum, acts 
cognitively insofar as it senses its environment and conveys information to other parts of the 
plant; that is, in their words, “it transmits an influence to the upper adjoining part, causing it to 
bend.”1 Plant neurobiologists have recently taken up The Power of Movement in Plants as a 
corrective to the Aristotelian concept of plants as automatically or passively nutritive.2 Whereas 
classical animals possess appetite, locomotion, and sensation—in addition to these, humans are 
endowed with reason—plants are limited to nutrition, mere absorption for the primal sake of 
reproduction. To the contrary, the Darwins unearth cognitive organisms highly sensitive to their 
environments, capable of detecting and responding to stimuli, and equipped with brain-like 
organs that regulate behavior. Plants are, at the very least, minimally cognitive. 
 Adapted from theories of embodied cognition, minimal cognition has gained traction in 
the cognitive sciences not only as a critique of anthropocentric and brain-bound models of 
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cognition but also as a more expansive approach to understanding the sensorimotor capacities of 
what the early modern naturalist Thomas Moffett identifed as “lesser living creatures,” those 
species inhabiting the lower rungs of the Great Chain of Being.3 As a neurobiological concept, 
minimal cognition initially described the ways in which neuralia—a clade of animals at the 
margins of nervous systems—interact with their environments, sense their surroundings, and 
behave accordingly.4 Minimal cognition was, at its core, an ecological theory insofar as it 
attempted to account for the sensory relationships that a “simple” animal makes within a larger 
ecosystem. Paco Calvo Garzón and Fred Keijzer, however, lament that the wider field has not yet 
taken up minimal cognition to study plant life: “Up to now, plants have not received much 
attention within embodied cognition. Most of those working in the field have employed a default 
assumption that intelligence is at a minimum an animal thing that was best caught in studies with 
free-moving agents … while excluding sessile plants.”5 They recommend extending minimal 
cognition to plants because plants meet the elementary requirements of cognition; that is, 
metabolic organization based on “[m]anipulating the extra-organismal environment” as a 
“biological strategy” for survival.6 This more inclusive model of cognition allows for the 
expansion (or perhaps even reconfiguration) of what Aristotle describes as the sensus communis, 
the “common sense,” where sensation is shared across species and where the commons (from the 
Greek koinos) becomes a more thoughtful commonplace, a cognitive ecology shaped by humans 
and nonhumans alike.7 
 Darwin’s root-brain hypothesis postulates similitude between animals and plants, a 
relationship anticipated by early moderns who, following Aristotle, may have thought of plants 
as rooted animals. Even John Milton, in his description of the earth’s creation in Paradise Lost, 
imagines animals as botanical: a stag with his “branching head,” the behemoth and sheep “[a]s 
plants” rising “out of the ground” (7.456, 470-73).8 In this essay, it is my contention that Milton 
not only imagines plants as minimally cognitive beings but also situates them in an affective 
ecology whereby they enter the into the poem’s circuits of desire with appetites of their very 
own. Specifically, by turning to the medicinal theories of Paracelsus, I claim that early modern 
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humans and plants shared a historically particular form of intimacy predicated on anatomical 
resemblance, which Milton eroticizes and radicalizes as ontologically identical yet hierarchized 
materiality. What we find in Milton’s epic is the intelligent coextension of botanic matter. As 
plants incite desire with their wooden bodies, silken blooms, and sweet fruit flesh so too do they 
become desirous, their seeds quietly yearning for their own plots. Cross-species similitude in 
Paradise Lost enables a new sensus communis where cognition is subtler, perhaps less legible to 
the mammalian cortex, and where nonhuman vagaries of desire foster alternate conceptions of 
ecologic communality. All begin at the root. 
 Not unlike scientists following in the footsteps of Darwin, the philosopher Michael 
Marder pursues a theory of plant thinking that is non-ideational, non-imagistic, and divorced 
from the logics of the mammalian brain and central nervous system, what, he suggests, are 
effects of evolutionary engineering that “[offered] a novel solution to the old problem of life, 
which had been already raised, differently, in the very ontology of plants.”9 That is to say that 
plants followed an alternate and ancient evolutionary path, divergent from cerebrated organisms, 
by acquiring distinct bodily technologies to manage the requirements of life. Marder argues that 
plants possess “non-conscious intentionality” intrinsic to the very matter of their being, 
materialized by their chlorophyllous anatomies, and made manifest by their tropistic behaviors: 
“[T]he non-conscious life of plants is a kind of ‘thinking before thinking,’ an inventiveness 
independent from instinctual adaptation and from formal intelligence alike.”10 Whereas the 
cognitive sciences, especially those invested in theories of embodied cognition, might support 
such a claim (and Marder acknowledges that “biology abounds in examples of ‘informational 
retrieval’ by plants”), I suggest that Milton’s epic provides poetic instances of plant thinking, not 
only in plants that appear cognitive—which they are—but also the ways in which plants refuse 
subjective and identitarian forms of knowing.11 Paradise Lost, while conversant with science, 
extends a critique of identity on its own literary terms by depicting thinking plants alongside 
thinking humans—the very first on earth, Adam and Eve—who dwell in the shade of a 
particularly dangerous tree. 
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 The root-brain in Paradise Lost grounds the figure of a flowering plant that allegorizes 
Milton’s philosophical monism: 
So from the root 
Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves 
More airy, last the bright consummate flower 
Spirits odorous breathes: flowers and their fruit 
Man’s nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed 
To vital spirits aspire, to animal, 
To intellectual, give both life and sense, 
Fancy and understanding. (5.479-85) 
As Milton re-inscribes the primacy of the Great Chain of Being along the plant’s vertical ascent 
from root to stalk to flower, so too does he incorporate plant life into “one first matter all,” the 
primordial element animating the entire monist cosmos (5.472). What’s more is that the plant 
seems to display “non-conscious intentionality,” to borrow Marder’s term, in its noble aspiration 
to vital spirituality. Plant matter, “flowers and their fruit,” serve “[m]an’s nourishment” and, in 
doing so, enable not only life but also life’s complex intellectual processes: “sense, / Fancy and 
understanding.” In this way, the root materially functions as the root-brain of Milton’s cognitive 
ecology; that is to say, both human and animal cognition begin with the plant’s desire for 
sublimity. Ken Hiltner reminds us in his book-length study that mind and ecology are 
inseparable in Paradise Lost and that “Milton’s much-noted rejection” of Descartes’ mind-body 
split is also a rejection of “mind-place” dualism.12  
 The following example from Book 9, I argue, illustrates Milton’s take on “plant 
thinking.” Eve makes herself vulnerable to Satan’s wiles in her dogged insistence to tend to the 
garden alone, a daily task she had previously undertaken in the protective custody of Adam. 
Together, they had tended to the garden’s excessive and unruly plants, “over-woody” and 
overreaching, requiring “hands to check” the “fruitless embraces” of their non-procreative 
conjugations. Seeking to rectify these childless relationships, the first couple officiated botanical 
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marriages—“they led the vine / To wed the elm”—a georgic trope borrowed from both classical 
and contemporary sources.13 On this day, however, Eve goes at it alone, so “from her husband’s 
hand her hand / Soft she withdrew” (9.385-6).  Detecting an opportunity for mischief, Satan 
searches for her in the garden: 
Veiled in a cloud of fragrance, where she stood, 
Half spied, so thick the roses bushing round 
About her glowed, oft stopping to support 
Each flower of slender stalk, whose head though gay 
Carnation, purple, azure, or specked with gold, 
Hung drooping unsustained, them she upstays 
Gently with myrtle band, mindless the while. (9.425-31) 
As Eve ties up sagging stalks weighed down by heavy blossoms with twine woven of myrtle, 
Milton curiously characterizes her as “mindless.” The term registers the prosaic nature of her 
horticultural labor, nearly automatic gestures conveyed through neural pathways so deeply 
inscribed that they require minimal effort to accomplish. Mindlessness in the garden is habitual, 
on the cusp of involuntary. However, “mindless” may also refer to a more literal state of having 
no mind. To not mind is to forsake worry, to forgive a sleight, and to surrender a second thought. 
Such colloquialism might imply Eve’s ignorance of her eventual deception by a fallen angel in 
disguise, or it could, more cynically, foreshadow Eve’s propensity to not mind—that is, to 
deliberately disobey—God’s frugivorous prohibition, a transgression that warrants cosmic 
consequences.  
 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that Eve is brainless or that she lacks a neural body 
innervating her paradisiacal ecology. Eve’s mindlessness is an event of the assemblage: the 
contact of brain, body, and plant in which the boundaries of each become less definite. Milton’s 
sensorial language thickens the poetic line with ponderous aromas and rosy clusters that obscure 
Eve’s human form, at least partially, so that Satan only halfway spies her. In Milton’s biological 
haze—what amounts to a literary act of Renaissance sfumato—Eve performs the heliotropic 
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function of the plant’s sensorimotor system, lifting blooms to the sky just as a stalk naturally 
twists toward the sun. Eve thinks like a plant. 
 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle raises the question, “If one has no belief of anything, but is 
equally [homoios] thinking and not thinking, how would one differ from a plant?”14 Implicit to 
Aristotle’s question is the assumption that plants are as thoughtless as they are faithless. Marder 
answers back:  
A human being equal (homoios) to a plant is one who is equally (homoios) 
thinking and not thinking … The human who thinks like a plant literally becomes 
a plant, since the destruction of classical logos annihilates the thing that 
distinguishes us from other living beings … To be fair, a vegetable-like person is 
not one who no longer thinks but … one who thinks without following the 
prescriptions of formal logic and therefore, in some sense, without thinking.15 
“Mindless” Eve becomes-plant in the rhizomatic sense as she joins the earth’s photosynthetic 
mechanism. Mindlessness is not non-cognitive. It is the momentary forgetting of the self-
constituted subject and an openness to the nonhuman dynamisms of the text’s ecology. 
 With a “sidelong” approach through the fallen leaves of the ground cover, Satan attempts 
to grab Eve’s attention. Again, Eve “mind[s] not,” preferring instead to continue her work: 
So varied he, and of his tortuous train 
Curled many a wanton wreath in sight of Eve, 
To lure her eyes; she busied heard the sound  
Of rustling leaves, but minded not. (9.516-9) 
A tropology of entanglement persists from the poem’s earlier books as Satan’s “wanton” coils 
echo Eve’s “wanton ringlets” of hair (4.306). Eve ignores the serpent’s cues, assuming nothing 
out of the ordinary (9.519-21). That is until the reptile speaks. Perplexed by his linguistic facility, 
she questions: 
What may this mean? Language of man pronounced 
By tongue of brute, and human sense expressed? 
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The first at least of these I thought denied  
To beasts, whom God on their creation-day 
Created mute to all articulate sound. (9.553-7) 
Animals, like plants, were brought forth by God without voice and without a rational soul, the 
requisite markers of human exceptionalism. Satan replies that he too was once like “other beasts 
that graze / The trodden herb,” only minimally intelligent, “of abject thoughts and low” (9.571-
2). He remembers climbing the Tree of Knowledge, coiling upward and around its trunk toward 
the heavy fruit. From atop, he instigated a hierarchy of consumption: “All other beasts that saw, 
with like desire / Longing and envying stood, but could not reach” (9.592-3). Those unable to 
access the fruit resigned in their dumb envy. His intellectual ascent, he promises Eve, was 
attained by “tasting those fair apples”: 
Ere long I might perceive 
Strange alteration in me, to degree 
Of reason and inward powers, and speech 
Wanted not long, though to this shape retained. (9.598-601) 
With cognition incongruous to his shape, the serpent persuasively verbalizes the fruit’s virtues. 
Most readers recognize Satan as the text’s primary tempter—Milton describes him as “[t]he 
tempter all impassioned”—but the plant itself plays an equal part in Eve’s seduction (9.678). 
Milton’s fruit is desirable, but it is also desirous, exercising the non-subjective desire of plants to 
enter into relation with other species.  
 In The Botany of Desire, Michael Pollan argues that it is the plant’s genetic imperative to 
cleverly manipulate not only humans but also other non-plant species to propagate its genetic 
code. The gardener, who seeds, tends, and harvests her yield, is no different from the insect, 
seduced by the flower to transfer its pollen. Pollan comes to this realization not in Milton’s 
garden but in his own, while pondering the “knobby charms” of potatoes: “All these plants, 
which I’d always regarded as the objects of my desire, were also, I realized, subjects acting on 
me, getting me to do things for them they couldn’t do for themselves.”16 Shifting power relations, 
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even those beneath the level of consciousness, inhere in the encounter. “We automatically think 
of domestication as something we do to other species,” Pollan writes, “but it makes just as much 
sense to think of it as something certain plants and animals have done to us, a clever evolutionary 
strategy for advancing their own interests.”17  It might be argued then that Adam and Eve’s labor 
in the garden, as a reciprocal form of domestication, is compelled not only by God—“fill the 
earth, subdue it, and throughout dominion hold,” he commands—but also by plants, the 
unconscious yet nonetheless intentional work of plants to remake the human (7.531-2).  
 Pollan’s first chapter takes a “pomocentric” approach to account for the sociobiological 
history of apples. Western cultural, literary, and religious traditions represent the fateful fruit 
from the Tree of Knowledge as an apple. Milton refers to it as such not only in Paradise Lost but 
also decades earlier in the Areopagitica, where he writes, “It was from out the rind of one apple 
tasted that the knowledge of good and evil, as two twins cleaving together, leaped forth into the 
world.”18 The bible, however, never identifies the fruit as an apple. Pollan too doubts its biblical 
provenance because “that part of the world is generally too hot for apples.”19 This “mistake,” he 
argues, serves as evidence of “the apple’s gift for insinuating itself into every sort of human 
environment, even, apparently, a biblical one.” This “gift” is part and parcel of the apple’s appeal 
to the senses, the ways in which it materializes desire in its sweet flesh, turning intentionality 
outward with its ruddy sheen and crisp scent wafting through the air. Like a ventriloquist, the 
fruit of good and evil speaks its sweetness through the figure of the serpent: 
I chanced 
A goodly tree far distant to behold 
Loaden with fruit of fairest colours mixed, 
Ruddy and gold: I nearer drew to gaze; 
When from the boughs a savoury odour blown, 
Grateful to appetite, more pleased my sense. (9, 575-80) 
Satan narrates his own entrapment by the plant’s sensuous wiles, drawn first through the eyes by 
its Petrarchan coloration and then through the ophidian vomeronasal system by its delectable 
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aroma: “hunger and thirst at once, / Powerful persuaders, quickened at the scent / Of that alluring 
fruit” (9.586-9).20 As the fruit intensifies its seduction of Satan’s senses, he likens its scent to that 
of another plant, “smell of sweetest fennel,” and then to the ambrosial yield of a lactating 
ruminant, “the teats / Of ewe or goat dropping with milk” (9.581-2).21 Pollan assumes that “our 
first experience of sweetness comes with our mother’s milk,” but Milton circumvents this 
infantile experience at the breast by having Eve arrive into the world not at her mother’s breast 
but at Adam’s.22 “Sweetness,” Pollan continues, “has proved to be a force in evolution … [I]n 
exchange for [the fruit’s] fructose,” nature’s crystalline form of energy, “the animals provide the 
seeds with transportation, allowing the plant to extend its range. As parties to this grand 
coevolutionary bargain, animals with the strongest predilection for sweetness and plants offering 
the biggest, sweetest fruits prospered together.” The apple is built to arouse the appetites of its 
seed bearers, and Eve becomes the greatest of all. 
 She at last confronts the forbidden fruit, its full botanic powers on display (9.632, 679). 
In Genesis, the fruit merely appeals to Eve’s vision—it is described as “pleasant to the eyes” 
(Genesis 3:6)—but in Milton’s revision, it enjoins each of her five senses: 
Fixed on the fruit she gazed, which to behold 
Might tempt alone, and in her ears the sound 
Yet rung of [Satan’s] persuasive words … 
And waked 
An eager appetite, raised by the smell 
So savoury of the fruit, which with desire, 
Inclinable now grown to touch or taste 
Solicited her longing eye. (9.735-7; 739-43) 
The double spondee—“she plucked, she ate”— consummates the seduction. The ménage a trois 
of plant, animal, and human—fruit, serpent, and Eve—simultaneously ratifies yet confounds 
Aristotle’s tripartite ontology, portending an ecology of desire co-shaped by the conscious and 
unconscious appetites of both fully cognitive and minimally cognitive organisms (9.781). 
 10 
Furthermore, what Eve hopes is medicine, “Here grows the cure of all, this fruit divine,” proves 
to be poison (9.776). Within the core of the apple is what Pollan identifies as a pentagram—an 
unholy geometry in modern occultism—of “five small chambers arrayed in a perfectly 
symmetrical starburst. Each of the chambers holds a seed … contain[ing] a small quantity of 
cyanide, probably a defense the apple evolved to discourage animals from biting into them.”23 
The forbidden apple’s promise of heightened cognition, of giving voice to the mute, reason to the 
animal, is ultimately embittered by the sinfulness of its seed. 
 At the heart of the poem’s cognitive interplay is an abiding similitude between humans 
and plants, a relation that generates intensely affective experiences of desire, prohibition, and 
repudiation both inside and outside of Eden, before and after the Fall. To account for these, the 
latter half of this essay joins queer readings of Milton’s epic to the history of early modern 
medicine—namely, Paracelsian pharmacology—to show how cross-species interactions are 
conceptually structured, in part, on a principle of anatomical similitude, one which, perhaps 
surprisingly, evokes the prospect of homosexuality.  
 Arguing for homosexuality in Milton, much less in the early modern period, is well-trod 
turf with most debates centering on Milton’s intimate friendship with Charles Diodati, whom he 
met as a schoolboy while attending St. Paul’s and for whom he composed the elegy Epitaphium 
Damonis.24 That’s not to mention those critics who still shake their heads and point to the much-
cited moment in The History of Sexuality, where Michel Foucault tells us that the figure of the 
homosexual only became a distinct “species” or “personage” simultaneous with nineteenth-
century medical and psychological discourses on sex, to prove that homosexuality did not exist 
in early modern England.25 Attempting to undo what has been taken as Foucault's 
historiographical dogmatism, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick interrogates the epistemic shift between 
“before homosexuality” and “after homosexuality,” arguing instead for the “coexistence of 
different models” of sexuality that complicate the notion of a single narrative and an easy break.26 
Following suit, in “Queering History,” Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon wonder what it 
might mean to do a “homohistory”; that is, to conceive of history not in terms of difference but 
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of similarity and to question why “we apprehend the past” as synonymous with alterity.27 A 
homohistory does not require historicizing homosexuality as an identitarian category but rather 
demands attending to the indefinability of homosexuality and thereby “expanding the 
possibilities of the nonhetero, with all its connotations of sameness, similarity.”28 Even for 
Foucault, the homosexual as a modern construct was indefinable and never fully knowable: “a 
life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology.”29  
 The question of anatomy—that is, bodies and the arrangements of their parts—is of 
critical significance to the ontology and epistemology of the homosexual. A sexed body geared 
by its propensity toward other bodies with homologous parts not only makes the homosexual but 
makes the homosexual knowable in the first place. The “homo” of “homosexuality,” meaning 
“same” in Greek, denotes this desire for sameness. That is to say, on a fundamental level, the 
concept of homosexuality relies on sexed bodies with specific bodily configurations (however 
discursively and materially produced), desiring other bodies with congruent configurations. 
Approaching homosexuality in terms of form and materiality, as opposed to identity or politics, 
allows us to consider eroticism across ontological borders—human, animal, plant, mineral, 
thing—sharing morphological equivalency. Foucault's analysis of homosexuality is decidedly 
anthropocentric. Perhaps rightly so, but I echo Karen Barad's critique that “Foucault's 
genealogical analysis focuses on the production of human bodies, to the exclusion of nonhuman 
bodies whose constitution he takes for granted.”30 If homosexuality is, even at least partially, a 
phenomenon of shared morphology, then is it unthinkable that desire might be imbedded in 
materiality? In the corresponding flesh of humans and nonhumans? 
 In The Seeds of Things, Goldberg turns Milton’s materialism toward Lucretian atomism 
in an effort to “track signs of male desirability and of male-male desire in Milton … by locating 
it in the angels of Paradise Lost, who, in their ability to eat and make love, are embodiments of 
Milton’s monism.”31 Goldberg makes two interventions consequential to an ecological reading of 
Paradise Lost: the first in identifying possibilities for cross-species homoeroticism, especially in 
Adam’s friendship with the archangel Raphael, and the second in structuring Milton’s 
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materialism not only on a philosophy of ontological sameness but also in terms of homo-ness to 
show that “sexual desire is not incompatible with philosophical monism.” Toward the first, he 
directs us to homoerotically charged moments of eating shared between Adam and Raphael in 
which erotic similes turn edible and thereafter digestible. Adam says to the angel: 
For while I sit with thee, I seem in heaven, 
And sweeter thy discourse is to my ear 
Than fruits of palm-tree … 
They satiate, and soon fill, 
Though pleasant, but thy words with grace divine 
Imbued, bring to their sweetness no satiety. (8. 210-2, 14-6) 
Saccharine tropes temporarily satisfy but ultimately fail to quench Adam’s appetite for angelic 
conversation, a mutual circulation of discourse and desire within “an organic cosmos living by 
means of a metabolic process that is not merely analogized when described as eating.”32 Goldberg 
reminds us that, for Milton, “knowledge is as food,” to which I would add that food is also 
botanic, a fact that holds true for the eventual fall. In Adam and Raphael’s exchange, Goldberg 
observes the necessarily unequal interactions across ontological boundaries, “[They] may both be 
male, but one is angel and the other is not: the specter of cross-species desire is thus present as a 
division within male gender as firm as that which separates male and female.”33 The firmness of 
that division is what’s at stake. How wide are the gaps between gender, between species, 
between human and angel and plant, “if earth / be the shadow of heaven, and things therein / 
Each to other like” (5.574-6)? 
 Toward the second intervention Goldberg locates in Milton’s monism what he refers to as 
“homo-materialism,” a philosophical principle characterizing a literary universe where a single 
material substance animates all earthly and heavenly bodies.34 In an endnote, he elaborates, “I 
mean to allude to the argument that [Leo] Bersani has been making lately about a homo-ness that 
extends beyond sexual matters to a broader sense of worldly connectedness based in sameness.”35 
Bersani, one of the major thinkers with whom Goldberg converses in The Seeds of Things, has 
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moved from the psychoanalytically inflected self-shattering of sex in his earlier work to a more 
recent interest in what he describes as “correspondences of forms within a universal solidarity of 
being.”36 In “Sociality & Sexuality,” Bersani claims that “[a]ll love is, in a sense, homoerotic.”37 
An impossible, if not at least baffling statement on its surface, Bersani insists that “[e]ven in the 
love between a man and a woman, each partner rejoices in finding himself, or herself, in the 
other,” a concept he later develops as “impersonal narcissism” in conversation with Adam 
Phillips in Intimacies.38 Bersani takes seriously Foucault’s call for “new relational modes” by 
rediscovering a sort of specular love in The Symposium and Phaedra where a “lover 
narcissistically loves the image of his own universal individuation that he implants in the boy he 
loves, but he is implanting more of what his beloved is, more of the type of being they already 
share.”39 Impersonal narcissism requires, in effect, that the subject love an idealized yet distorted 
version of the self possessed by the other—a phenomenon of both sameness and difference “in 
which the very opposition … becomes irrelevant as a structuring category of being.”40 
 In “Unworking Milton: Steps to a Georgics of the Mind,” Steven Swarbrick follows a 
similar critical genealogy to help us understand that the “other” in this “relational field” is not 
necessarily human nor is it, as I argue, necessarily cerebrated, especially in Milton’s Ovidian 
rewriting of the Narcissus myth.41 Eve remembers her lakeside sexual awakening: 
I thither went 
With unexperienced thought, and laid me down 
On the green bank, to look into the clear 
Smooth lake, that to me seemed another sky. 
As I bent down to look, just opposite, 
A shape within the water gleam appeared 
Bending to look on me, I started back, 
It started back, but pleased I soon returned, 
Pleased it returned as soon with answering looks 
Of sympathy and love. (4.457-65) 
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What Eve sees in the water is the natural effect of ecologic assemblage: a dynamic relay of liquid 
and air, body and image, a startled withdrawal and then curious return to the water’s edge, 
compelled by the specular interactions of the environment. Eve’s “I” doubly becomes “it,” and 
“it” (notably not Eve) answers with “sympathy and love.” I read this scene of narcissism not so 
different from Eve’s seduction by the fruit: yet another materialist actualization of desire that 
crosses ontological boundaries by concentrating affective density in figures of non-humanity. 
What Swarbrick describes as “a material composite of sound and light, a sonorous, ‘watery 
image’” is also the reverberation of the human against the inhuman, an event where similitude 
might easily become undone by a wayward ripple or errant shaft of sunlight.42 What is at first 
foreign to Eve on the water’s reflective surface becomes familiar, a sympathetic figure that 
reliably returns and amplifies her expressions of love. 
 This moment in particular has experienced many returns in queer criticism on Paradise 
Lost. For example, in “Adam and Eve and the Failure of Heterosexuality,” Will Stockton argues 
that straight sex is doomed to fail because neither man nor woman is capable of achieving 
gratification with the other.43 Postlapsarian Adam fantasizes about a “masculine” world “without 
feminine,” one without Eve—“ O why did God … create at last / This novelty on earth, this fair 
defect / Of nature? … Or find some other way to generate / Mankind?” (10.888; 90-2, 94-5)—
begging instead for a fellow, who Stockton jokingly names “Steve.” Eve, on the other hand, 
enacts her own stubbornness to heterosexuality by originally preferring her own reflection to 
Adam, whom she finds “less fair …[t]han that smooth wat’ry image” (4.478, 80). James Holstun 
reads her reluctance to Adam as evidence of her natural lesbianism.44 Nostalgic for how she once 
“pined with vain desire” for her own “shape,” Eve laments God’s correction of her narcissistic 
error by redirecting her sexuality to its properly gendered object (4.466). This alternate route, 
however, is a mere heteroticized version of her lakeside narcissism. Adam is her original and she 
his image. “He / Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy,” God commands (4.471-2). Her 
reflection is a visual iteration of a sameness that joins her to him and, consequently, them to the 
universe. Reproduction too is a multiplication of similitude: “To him shalt bear / Multitudes like 
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thy self” (4.473-4). The primacy of heterosexuality in Milton’s epic is diminished by an 
originary desire for similitude that proliferates seemingly ad infinitum. 
 Difference too in Paradise Lost is an effect of materiality, occurring in degrees and forms 
“of substance”: 
One almighty is, from whom 
All things proceed, and up to him return, 
If not depraved from good, created all 
Such to perfection, one first matter all 
Indued with various forms, various degrees 
Of substance, and in things that live, of life. (5.469-74) 
Even gender difference is, in part, a phenomenon of material sameness as Eve herself is culled 
from Adam’s torso: “Manlike, but different sex, so lovely fair” (8.471). God shapes Eve not just 
from her husband’s bone but from the very matter that composes the cosmos. Milton’s 
description of Eve as “manlike” masculinizes only insofar as it characterizes shared corporeality. 
Even in their darkest hour, Adam’s materialist promise to Eve echoes marriage vows, “Flesh of 
flesh / Bone of my bone thou art, and from thy state / Mine never shall be parted” (9. 914-6). 
Homo-materialism avows shared materiality between genders as well as across species. The 
point is made most vividly in Raphael’s narration of angelic intercourse, which Goldberg insists 
is “undeniably homo”: “Whatever pure thou in the body enjoy’st … we enjoy / In eminence” 
(8.622-4). Raphael proceeds to describe the supernal concoction, “Total they mix, union of pure 
with pure / Desiring,” ignoring impediments “of membrane, joint, or limb” (8.627-8, 625). 
Hierarchized angelic order dissolves in unimpeded, virtually egalitarian ecstasy. Foucault might 
call angelic sex an “event,” which “is neither substance, nor accident, nor quality nor process; 
events are not corporeal. And yet, an event is certainly not immaterial; it takes effect, becomes 
effect, always on the level of materiality” (231). Divine coitus as non-procreative sex, Goldberg 
sharply observes, finds its counterpart not only in prelapsarian sex—Adam and Eve do no 
reproduce until after the fall—but also in the “sex lives of plants in Eden whose exuberance 
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includes ‘fruitless embraces.’”45 Goldberg’s angelic intervention is also an invitation to ponder 
the desires of other nonhumans—specifically, plants—and the ways in which same sex desire 
transgresses the species border in Paradise Lost. 
 Plant sexuality is more so an invention of the eighteenth century than of the Renaissance; 
however, eighteenth-century discoveries in botany were spurred by the cultural and scientific 
demands of the previous century. In Nature’s Body, Londa Schiebinger informs us that during 
“the seventeenth century, academic botanists began to break their ties with medical 
practitioners”—the herbalists, physicians, and naturalists of the sixteenth century—and instead 
approached the “[n]ew plant materials from the voyages of discovery and the new colonies” 
coming into Europe for the very first time.46 The number of plants known to Europeans 
quadrupled in number between 1550 and 1700. With such a massive influx, “emphasis on 
classification turned from medical application to more general and theoretical issues of pure 
taxonomy,” finding ways to organize a constantly growing amount of information. One way to 
do this, at least for the father of modern taxonomy, was to mobilize human tropes of sex and 
gender into scientific discourses of classification. In Systema naturae (1735), Carl Linnaeus 
developed a system of organization, popularly known as binomial nomenclature, based on sexual 
difference and in which certain anatomical parts of plants correspond with either male or female 
human genitalia. His taxonomical method, Schiebinger tells us, “though focused on reproductive 
organs, ... did not capture fundamental sexual functions.”47 Instead, like his early modern 
predecessors, who saw their own bodies reflected in the anatomies of plants, “it focused on 
purely morphological features.” For example, the stamen, the pollen-containing anther, 
corresponds to the male penis, while the pistil corresponds to the female ovary. Linnaeus’ 
approach, however, was not entirely new; he borrowed such representations from early modern 
notions of anatomical analogy. He was likely familiar with Philemon Holland's 1601 translation 
of Pliny's Natural History, which includes a description of a species of male frankincense, so 
named for its resemblance to human testes, as well Joseph Pitton de Tournefort's 1609 
standardization of the term pistil (pistile in French) to classify the ovary of the flower.48 The ways 
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in which eighteenth-century botanists mapped human sexuality onto plants find their antecedents 
in early modern discourses of medicine and natural history.  
 Schiebinger identifies “two levels in the sexual politics of early modern botany,” the first 
being “the implicit use of gender to structure botanical taxonomy” and the second,” the explicit 
use of human sexual metaphors to introduce notions of plant reproduction into botanical 
literature.”49 Linnaeus not only sexes plants in terms of functional similitude to human genitalia 
but also conscripts botanical reproduction into what Adrienne Rich calls “compulsory 
heterosexuality.”50 He describes in Praeludia sponsaliorum plantarum how plants perform 
heterosexual rituals of courtship: 
The flowers' leaves … serve as bridal beds which the Creator has so gloriously 
arranged, adorned with such noble bed curtains, and perfumed with many soft 
scents the bride-groom with his bride might there celebrate their nuptials so much 
the greater solemnity. When now the bed is so prepared, it is time for the 
bridegroom to embrace his beloved bride and offer her his gifts.51 
Reading his descriptions of botanical reproduction, one might easily forget that Linnaeus is 
writing about plants and not humans. The casualties of heteronormative anthropomorphism, 
plants, for Linnaeus are highly erotic creatures, who not only have sex with one another but do 
so within the cultural directives of marriage. These botanical marriages, however, were always 
already queer, not only the ways in which plant reproduction crosses with that of humans, but 
also because flowers pose an interesting morphological problem; they possess both male and 
female sex organs. They are hermaphroditic. The theory of sexual dimorphism unravels against a 
floral body that unites the male with the female, the masculine with the feminine, the bridegroom 
and his bride within its virescent anatomy, in turn, problematizing categories of “natural sex.” 
Sexual difference as well as gender difference is represented as a division within the figure of the 
plant itself, which, for Linnaeus, is not the other of the human but that which becomes more 
humanlike via collection, observation, and classification. 
 Paradise Lost is a veritable herbarium of plants: medicinal herbs, flowers, and fruit that 
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take effect not according to a logic of sexual dimorphism but vis-à-vis a theory of anatomical 
resemblance. After the Fall, the archangel Michael restores Adam’s lost eyesight with a common 
herbal remedy: 
Michael from Adam’s eyes the film removed 
Which false fruit that promised clearer sight 
Had bred; then purged with euphrasy and rue 
The visual nerve, for he had much to see. (9.411-5) 
“Euphrasy,” popularly known as “eyebright” but referred to by taxonomists as Euphrasia 
officinalis, is a botanical genus comprising hundreds of varieties of flowering plants indigenous 
to the dry heaths and pastures of Europe, Asia, and North America. Because of its distinct 
morphology but mostly for its pharmacological potency, several European species of eyebright 
quite literally “caught the eye” of sixteenth and seventeenth-century naturalists. Early modern 
herbals, including John Gerard’s Generall Historie of Plants, declare the flower to serve as “a 
most sovereign remedie” for eye diseases: “Eye-bright … taketh away all hurts from the eyes, 
comforteth the memorie, and cleareth the sight, if halfe a spoonful be taken euery morning.”52 
Folkloric medicine believed eyebright to brighten eyes dimmed by sickness. These days, 
physicians might agree. Medical research indicates that eyebright effectively treats eye 
infections, notably conjunctivitis, which produces a viscous, mucoid film over the eye’s exterior 
surface and which sometimes impairs vision.53 Eyebright reduces the severity of these symptoms. 
Although the findings of these studies give credence to Michael’s medicine, this is not to say that 
Milton’s Adam is afflicted by conjunctivitis. (In fact, he is afflicted by something much, much 
worse—the wrath of God and expulsion from Paradise.) My intention is not to retrospectively 
diagnose. Rather, I am arguing for the ways in which Milton’s literary text intercepts the mythos 
of early modern folk medicine, while simultaneously entangling the molecularities of 
homeopathic pharmacology. Taking my cue from conjunctivitis, that is, conjunctivus from the 
Latin conjugere, meaning “to join together,” my aim throughout this essay has been to show how 
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Milton produces “joinings” across species, cognitive as well as horticultural graftings between 
humans and plants in intimate proximity. 
 Herbals were popular texts during the early modern period. In a recent essay, Elaine 
Leong demonstrates their cultural centrality as vernacular sources for domestic medicine.54 The 
massive compendiums contain pictorial representations of plants alongside explanations of their 
medicinal properties, appearance, and seasonal growth patterns. Because these manuals were so 
widely available during the seventeenth century, Milton, who suffered from glaucoma and 
eventual blindness, was likely familiar not only with eyebright and its therapeutic virtues but also 
with the wider discourse of herbal medicine. James Patrick McHenry goes so far to suggest that 
he was probably an “expert on the subject,” citing Milton’s prose piece, “Of Education,” in 
which he espouses learning natural histories of … plants” and inheriting “the helpful experiences 
of … gardeners.”55 We also know from Milton’s epistolary correspondence that he sought a cure 
for his waning vision. In a 1654 letter to Leonard Philaras, he requests medical advice from the 
Parisian oculist, Thévenot, hoping that “he can diagnose the causes and symptoms of the 
disease.”56 In the same year that Milton met Philaras, Nicholas Culpeper, an up-and-coming 
herbalist, published a well-known pharmacopeia, which stated that eyebright “helpeth all 
infirmities of the Eyes that caus dimness of Sight,” deriving its botanical potency “under the sign 
of Leo.”57 Eyebright’s appearance as a pharmaceutical in Paradise Lost evinces Milton’s 
familiarity with homeopathy. He may have even attempted botanical remedies on his own 
weakening eyes as he exhausted possibilities for a cure. 
 While Culpeper attributes eyebright’s curative power to the seasons and stars, molecular 
biology locates the flower’s power in its abundant antioxidants. Antioxidants are molecules that 
inhibit oxidation, a chemical process of electron transference, which may result in cell or tissue 
damage. Eyebright’s antioxidants inhabit the plant’s cell walls and possess salubrious binding 
properties that protect the body and its corollary parts against viruses, inflammation, and 
allergens, including those that afflict the eyes. Milton, however, did not know about antioxidants. 
Nor did he have access to the modes of scientific knowledge, technology, and discovery through 
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which acutely modern epistemologies of bodies are produced. Instead, early moderns relied on a 
quasi-religious, scientific theory of embodiment known as the Doctrine of Signatures and for—
what they thought was—good reason. 
 The intellectual seeds for the Doctrine of Signatures were first planted by Paracelsus 
during the sixteenth century. Working as a physician, astrologer, and naturalist on the continent, 
Paracelsus developed a philosophy that combined Christian Neoplatonism, as revived by 
Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola of the Florentine Academy, with the late medieval 
alchemical tradition. F. David Hoeniger characterizes his metaphysics as “a vitalist interpretation 
of the universe, which postulates that everything in creation is alive and interacts, … the earth 
with its minerals, the air with its winds and clouds, and the planet.”58 Indeed, in The Matter of 
Revolution, John Rogers argues that Milton’s materialism arises not from Lucretian atomism but 
from Paracelsian cosmography, “Milton, like a number of midcentury vitalists, claims affinity 
with a philosophy of matter derived ultimately from … [t]he theories of the microcosm 
developed by Paracelsus … that linked man and the universe in a self-contained cosmic economy 
of interflux and exchange.”59 According to Paracelsus, all of the world’s beings were marked by 
arcane signatures revealing their divinely ordained functions in the world. These signatures were 
not mere signs—that is, inert, passive, or mute objects onto which meanings were inscribed—but 
rather, they incarnated a complex, cosmographical material-semiology. Signatures were 
materialized in the tissues, joints, and sinews of the earth’s heterogeneous bodies. They manifest 
as shapes, odors, colors, and textures. Although Paracelsian signatures were naturally 
exteriorized, these embodied hieroglyphs were cryptic and sometimes difficult to decipher. Early 
modern naturalists were charged with the task of “reading” these somatic marks and discerning 
their usefulness to humans. 
 Plant signatures were especially important during this time. The Doctrine of Signatures 
claimed that the morphology of a plant corresponds to its therapeutic effect on a part of the 
human body sharing similar features. For instance, the leaf of Hepatica acutiloba, otherwise 
known as liverwort, is shaped like a liver and, therefore, might be used to treat liver disease. Or, 
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to borrow an example from William Cole’s The Art of Simpling: 
The kernel [of a walnut] hath the very figure of the Brain, and therefore it is very 
profitable for the Brain, and resists poysons; for if the Kernel be bruised, and 
moystned with quintessence of Wine, and laid upon a Crown of the Head, it 
comforts the brain and head mightily.60  
Simply put, form fits function. The outward characteristics of plants determine their curative 
value. The same applies to Milton’s eyebright. The zygomorphic structure of its flower—the 
bilateral symmetry of the floral plane—produces morphological analogy between the blossom 
and the human eye. Coles elaborates, “The purple and yellow spots and stripes which are upon 
the flowers of the Eyebright doth very much resemble the diseases of the eye, as bloodshot, etc., 
by which signature it hath been found out that this herb is effectual for the curing of the same.”61 
Because the plant looks like an infected eye, it was believed to heal an infected eye. The 
Paracelsian, homeopathic method of similia similibus curantur (“like cures like”) diverged from 
the prevailing Galenic, allopathic method of contraria contraris curantur (“opposite cures 
opposite”). The Doctrine of Signatures purported sameness to be more therapeutic and 
“sovereign” than difference.62 
 Not everyone, however, was convinced by the Doctrine of Signatures. In 1691, John Ray, 
a prominent natural historian, insisted that the Doctrine of Signatures was “rather fancied by men 
than designed by Nature.”63 Today, some scientists echo this sentiment, deriding the Doctrine of 
Signatures as a quaint, blindfolded theory from days of yore. Bradley Bennett, for example, 
describes it as “primitive superstition” and a “much maligned theory” that was “primarily a 
symbolic device used to transfer information especially in preliterate societies.”64 To me, whether 
the Doctrine of Signatures is empirically “right” or “wrong” is neither here nor there. As part of 
what Goldberg and Menon call a homohistory, the theory provides a conceptual framework in 
which plants became desirable for their own attributes: the seductive geometries of their leafy 
bodies, the odors of their dripping blossoms, and the unseen powers of their chemical 
compounds. By generating anatomical resemblances between humans and plants, early moderns 
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inspired a form of cross-species intimacy that, by its very nature, evokes homosexuality: the 
“fancy” for the shape and proportion of one’s own body in the body of another. 
 In light of this reading, I want to return to Foucault and provisionally propose the 
recursivity of homosexuality or, at the very least, the latency of cross-species homoeroticism in 
one of his earlier texts, The Order of Things, by suggesting that homo-desire was never an 
exclusively human phenomenon. He tells us that, during the early modern period, “resemblance” 
played a vital role in productions of Western knowledge, “The universe was folded in upon 
itself: the earth echoing the sky, faces seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding 
within their stems the secrets that were of use to man.”65 The heterogeneous bodies of the world 
shared a “mutual attraction for one another,” not because of their difference but because of their 
similarity. These resemblances were made legible by signatures—nature's embodied 
semiology—and linked humans to their nonhuman counterparts in a cosmographical desire for 
sameness. The word was made flesh, and the flesh was made word through the universe's 
involuted material-semioticity. Humans saw themselves in the signatures of plants and were, 
therefore, drawn to them. They recognized their eyes in flowers, their hearts in leaves, and their 
veins in the fibers radiating through the earth's botanical anatomies. Through what we might 
consider desubjectifying affect, Foucault argues that sympathy is this natural impulse toward 
sameness: 
Sympathy is an instance of the Same so strong and so insistent that it will not rest 
content to be merely one of the forms of likeness; it has the dangerous power of 
assimilating, of rendering things identical to one another, of mingling them, of 
causing their individuality to disappear—and thus of rendering them foreign to 
what they were before. Sympathy transforms. It alters.66  
As a counterpoint, Foucault explains that complete and utter implosion into sameness is 
prevented by sympathy's twin, antipathy, which “encloses species within their impenetrable 
difference.”67 The balancing act between sympathy and antipathy ensures that resemblances exist 
without the total integration of discrete, singular bodies. Foucault's account of sympathy relies on 
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an episteme of analogy which, in The Order of Things, is proper to a particular historical epoch 
in the history of representation and which limits desire for sameness to nothing more than mere 
similarity. Milton, on the other hand, radicalizes sympathy into a more ontological as well as a 
more cognitive understanding of affective materiality. Plant matter acquires affective density not 
only through its morphological equivalency to humans but also through the minimally cognitive 
possibilities of mindlessness.  
 The premise of minimal cognition in the garden is further widened by the research of 
biologist Daniel Chamovitz, who openly and admittedly risks anthropomorphism by arguing for 
botanical sympathetic systems that are distinctly not nervous but that nonetheless correspond to 
the five human senses. In What a Plant Knows, he writes: 
Plants don’t have a central nervous system; a plant doesn’t have a brain that 
coordinates information for its entire body. Yet different parts of a plant are 
intimately connected, and information regarding light, chemicals in the air, and 
temperature is constantly exchanged between roots and leaves, flowers and stems, 
to yield a plant that is optimized for its environment. We can’t equate human 
behavior to the ways in which plants function in their worlds, but I ask that you 
humor me while I use terminology … that is usually reserved for human 
experience.68  
Chamovitz’ contention that plants can see—“plants monitor their visible environment all the 
time,” he writes—advances yet another mode of human-plant resemblance that, unlike the 
Doctrine of Signatures, privileges function over form.69 In The Power of Movement in Plants, the 
Darwins allege the existence of not only root brains but also plant eyes, light sensitive structures 
imbedded in the plant’s stem that determine the direction in which it bends.70 Plants, like humans, 
are able to detect light, transfer that stimulus to other parts of their bodies, and then respond 
accordingly. Both also possess photoreceptors, specialized cells evolutionarily configured to 
capture photons (particles representing a quantum of light). While plants possess photoreceptors 
unique to plants and humans possess photoreceptors unique to mammals, resemblance might be 
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detected further down the neurobiological chain at the level of the molecule. “Plant and human 
photoreceptors,” Chamovitz observes, “are similar in that they all consist of a protein connected 
to a chemical dye that absorbs the light.”71 Might desire for cross-species similitude lead to the 
tangled tertiary structures of proteins? Where the micro-processes of light detection fold and 
unfold similitude and difference across cellular membranes?  
 Eyebright may have looked like a human eye to early modern naturalists and, by such 
shape, proved its medicinal virtue, but while it was able to cure Adam’s ailing vision in Paradise 
Lost, it couldn’t save Milton’s. Blindness, it is worth noting, is also a botanic affliction, affecting 
plants in two distinct ways. The first is anatomical. A plant is structurally “blind” if it lacks buds 
or flowers. The second is sensory. “Blind” plants are unable to perceive light. Plants grown in 
darkness tend to grow longer and spindlier as they search for a light source. Chamovitz uses the 
term to refer to mutant species genetically engineered to not sense light or certain colors in the 
light spectrum.72 It is by such engineering that scientists were able to learn that plants possess 
roughly double the photoreceptors of humans and that, while plants do not “see” in images as 
animals do, they are able to perceive minute variations in color. Plants use this information to 
coordinate rest, photosynthesis, and germination. By genetically “turning off” the expression of 
certain photoreceptors, science effectively blinds plants to specific colors of light. 
 However, early modern plants, unlike these blinded mutants, were meant to see and to be 
seen, not only by humans in the pages of herbals and in the beds of gardens, but also by seed-
bearing animals that alight upon their protuberances for sustenance, reproduction, and survival. 
Even through the lens of the microscope, Nehemiah Grew revealed for the very first time 
botanical cellular structures in his 1682 Anatomy of Plants. “As imaging systems in their own 
right,” Swarbrick asserts, plants are “evolutionarily adapted” to “[train] human perception.”73 
Joanna Picciotto agrees that flowers in Paradise Lost are such imaging systems, serving as lenses 
or, rather, “floral spectacles” not for Adam and Eve but for Milton’s reader: “Milton literally 
makes flowers into spectacles … [to] reform the ‘eyes’ planted in us … to imagine ourselves—
sexual creatures condemned to work—as paradisal subjects.”74 This is the moral prerogative of 
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flowers.  
 Be that as it may, plants are not mere tools designed to instrumentalize or compensate for 
human deficiency. These prescient pedagogues make use of their own sophisticated visual 
systems to see us, to sense our presence when nearby, and to bend our will to theirs. Chamovitz 
observes, “Plants see if you come near them; they know when you stand over them … [and] see 
light in many ways and colors that we can only imagine.”75 What then might this mean for 
Milton’s Adam or for the poet himself to encounter an herb that likewise encounters him? Or for 
the forbidden fruit, suspended from the tree of knowledge in its seductive grace, to sense Eve’s 
inevitable approach, the shadow of her hand, the draw of her lips? The plant’s wiles are as 
deliberate as they are delicious. 
 When Milton asks his muse to inwardly “there plant eyes” in Book 3, the word “plant” 
presents a textual crux: 
So much the rather thou celestial light 
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers 
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence 
Purge and disperse. (3.50-3)  
One could read “plant” as a verb, the conventional reading, in which the blind poet covets 
prophetic inner sight like “Blind Thyramis and blind Maeonides / And Tiresias and Phineus 
prophets old” (3.35-6). That is, the poet asks his muse to grant him interior eyes so that he may 
“see and tell of things invisible to mortal sight” (3.54-5). The irradiated “celestial light” and the 
purging of “all mist” make such perspicacious vision possible. Eyebright achieves a similar 
effect for Adam after the fall, as Picciotto observes, “The purgative powers of … herbs pierce 
into ‘the inmost seat of mental sight,’ forcing sensitive eyes to close; once again, the eye is dug 
into, so that it can start to dig.”76 The eye becomes a hole, a figure of depth and openness filled 
with nerves and tissue, roots and soil. Behind it might be a brain, but that is not certain. The 
verbal, “to plant,” denotes not only the act of digging but also the seeding and cultivation of 
terrain: the willful deposit of a germinating organism in a substrate that incubates and minerally 
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nurtures its growth. The eyes then are seeds that the muse plants in the intellectual matter of the 
poet’s light-filled mind.  
 The alternate reading is to interpret “plant” as an adjective modifying “eyes”—not “there 
plant eyes,” a spatial directive, but rather “there plant eyes.” The logic of this reading is more 
opaque than the first but suggests that “plant eyes,” which might represent buds, flowers, or even 
a strange anthropomorphic hybrid, become surprisingly sensate in the luminescent topography of 
the author’s brain. Milton’s cognitive ecology in Paradise Lost urges us not only to know plants 
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